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Agriculture’s share of economic activity is known to vary inversely with a country’s level of 
development. This paper examines whether extensions of the neoclassical growth model can 
account for some important sectoral patterns observed in a current cross-section of countries and 
in the time series data for currently rich countries. We find that a straightforward agricultural 
extension of the neoclassical growth model restricted to match U.S. observations fails to account 
for important aspects of the cross-country data. We then introduce a version of the growth model 
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Economists have long recognized that agriculture’s share of economic activity varies 
inversely with the level of output. This is true both across countries and over time within 
a given country. Development economists have traditionally viewed the process of 
structural transformation  – including the relative decline of the agricultural sector  – as an 
important feature of the development process.
1  In contrast, modern growth theorists have 
tended to abstract from sectoral issues in their examination of international income 
differences. A major branch of recent research in this area uses one-sector versions of the 
neoclassical growth model to examine the impact of various policy distortions on steady-
state income levels. (Examples include: Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 1996, Parente and 
Prescott 1994, Prescott 1998, and Restuccia and Urrutia 2000.) A general finding of this 
research is that such models can plausibly account for the huge observed disparity in 
international incomes provided that the combined share of tangible and intangible capital 
in income is around two-thirds. 
  The purpose of this paper is to determine whether such models can also account for 
the sectoral patterns present in both the cross-section of countries and the time series of 
the currently rich countries.  To accomplish this we consider agricultural extensions of 
the neoclassical growth model and assess the quantitative implications of policy 
distortions on both incomes and sectoral composition for the models calibrated to US 
                                                 
1 The relevant literature from development economics on structural change is too large to summarize, but 
key works dealing with the changing importance of agriculture in the process of economic growth include:  
Johnston and Mellor 1961, Fei and Ranis 1964, Schultz 1964, Lewis 1965, Kuznets 1966, Chenery and 
Syrquin 1975, Johnston and Kilby 1975, Hayami and Ruttan 1985, Mellor 1986, Timmer 1988, Syrquin 
1988. A key debate in this literature is whether agriculture diminishes in importance because it has low   3
observations. By doing so, we hope to provide an additional test of these theories while 
also offering a careful investigation of the claim  – central to traditional development 
economics  – that sectoral differences are critical to understanding international income 
disparities. 
  Our analysis begins with a straightforward extension of the neoclassical growth 
model to include an agricultural sector. Following the literature, we consider policy 
differences across countries that serve to increase the cost of capital. We find that the 
model fails to replicate the enormous cross-country disparity in  relative productivities of 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  This is true whether we consider distortions 
that affect the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors equally or unequally.  As first noted 
by Kuznets (1971) for a small set of countries and documented here for a larger set of 
countries, output per worker in agriculture relative to output per worker in non-
agriculture is much smaller in poor countries than it is in rich countries. Moreover, for 
today’s rich countries, this ratio has been relatively stable most of the last century. 
    This failure leads us to seek an alternative version of the growth model that can 
account for these relative productivity differences as well as the other sectoral differences 
that exist across countries. Following Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000), we extend 
the standard growth model to incorporate Becker’s model of home production. We 
deviate from Parente  et al.  by incorporating spatial heterogeneity into our model so that 
home production possibilities differ between rural and urban regions. As in Parente et al., 
distortions that discourage capital accumulation move resources out of market activity 
and into household production. In our model, however, there is an additional effect. 
                                                                                                                                                 
inherent potential for growth (e.g., Fei and Ranis 1964, Lewis 1965) or because agricultural growth in some 
way stimulates non-agricultural sectors of the economy (e.g., Mellor 1986).    4
These distortions induce people to stay in the rural area, where they devote much of their 
time to home production. As a result, marketed agricultural output per worker is lower in 
distorted (poor) economies than in undistorted (rich) economies. We restrict the model’s 
parameters to roughly match the US observations over the 1870-1990 period and then 
explore the consequences of policy differences for cross country differences in income, 
sectoral compositions, and sectoral productivity. We find that the home production model 
can account for most of the sectoral differences observed across countries as well as the 
secular changes in the United State over the 1870-1990 period.   
  As with the home production story told by Parente et al. (2000), this story also has 
implications for true differences in living standards. Specifically, if poor countries have a 
disproportionate number of their workers living in rural areas and they devote a 
disproportionate amount of their time to activities not measured in the national accounts, 
then measured output differences will overstate true differences.  For this reason, we 
perform welfare comparisons between distorted and undistorted economies.  Despite 
there being more unmeasured output in the distorted economy, the welfare difference 
between rich and poor countries is still large. 
    We certainly are not the first to extend the neoclassical growth model to include an 
agricultural sector. An early literature dating to Uzawa (1963), Takayama (1963) and 
Inada (1963) explored two-sector growth models that could reasonably be interpreted as 
representing an agricultural sector and a non-agricultural sector. More recently, 
Echevarria (1995 and 1997) and Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1998) have examined the 
secular decline in agriculture’s importance in the currently rich, industrialized nations. 
These papers have not, however, sought to explain the current cross-country differences   5
in agriculture’s share of economic activity. In these papers, only initial capital stocks 
differ across countries, so that all the cross-section observations correspond to different 
points along the same equilibrium path. As we document, this view is inconsistent with 
the data. There are important differences between today’s poor countries and today’s rich 
countries at points in the past when they had approximately the same living standard.   
  There are a number of other dynamic general equilibrium models that likewise 
include an agricultural sector.  Glomm (1992), Matsuyama (1992), and Goodfriend and 
McDermott (1995) both take an endogenous growth approach. Laitner (1998) focuses on 
differences in savings patterns across countries. His model conforms to Engels’s Law, but 
the dynamics of his model are such that there are extended time periods during which 
only the agricultural sector is operating. Caselli and Coleman (1998) focus on the secular 
decline of agriculture in the United States and the associated decrease in living standard 
differences between northern and southern states.  
  Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the current sectoral 
differences across countries and within countries across points in time. Section 3, by way 
of background, reviews the standard neoclassical growth model. Section 4 analyzes the 
standard neoclassical growth model extended to include an agriculture sector. Section 5 
analyzes the home production extension of this model with an agricultural sector. Section 




   6
2.  Some Development Facts 
This section documents some key sectoral aspects of the development process.  We begin 
with two well-known facts. The first is that in a cross section of countries, the agricultural 
sector is relatively larger in poorer countries, whether measured in terms of outputs or 
inputs. Figure 1 plots agriculture’s share of GDP against real GDP per capita, using 1990 
data from the World Bank’s  Social Indicators of Development and Penn World Tables 
(PWT 5.6), while Figure 2 plots agriculture’s share of total employment against real GDP 
per capita, using 1990 data from the United Nations Human Development Report 1997 
and PWT 5.6.
2  The slope of the trend line fitted through the scatter plot in Figure 1 is –
0.094 while the slope of the trend line fitted through the scatter plot in Figure 2 is –0.20. 
The poorest countries have as much as 50 percent of GDP comprised of agriculture and 
as much as 70 percent of employment in this activity. In the rich countries, these two 
shares are less than 10 percent of the totals. 
  The second well-documented fact is from time series data: the relative size of the 
agriculture sector both in terms of output and employment declines as an economy 
develops. This is documented in Figures 3 and 4 using pooled time series data going back 
over two centuries for a set of 15 currently rich countries. In these figures the output and 
employment shares are plotted against each country’s GDP relative to the 1985 US level.
3 
Looking at Figure 4, for example, agriculture’s share of total employment was about 50 
                                                 
2 The World Bank’s Social Indicators of Development report agriculture’s share of GDP in 1990 for 150 
countries in the world. For six more countries, we were able to obtain data on agriculture’s share from the 
1997 United Nations Human Development Report, and for the United States we used data from the 1997 
Economic Report to the President. We then used all of these countries for which 1990 data on real per 
capita GDP were available in the Penn World Tables v. 5.6, leaving us with a total of 102 countries. 
3 Data on employment shares and GDP shares in agriculture are taken from Mitchell 1992, pp. 912-917; 
Kurian 1994, p. 93-94;  Mitchell 1993, pp. 775-77; and Mitchell 1995, pp. 1027-31.  Data on real per capita   7
percent in France in the mid-19
th century, and about 50 percent in Italy as late as 1920. 
During the 20
th century, however, these employment shares fell dramatically so that in 
1990 they stood at no more than 10 percent in any currently rich country and as little as 2 
percent in some countries.     
  The third fact is not as well known, though it is documented in  Kuznets (1971) for a 
smaller set of countries and an earlier time period. Using the data on agriculture’s share 
of GDP and employment, we compute a measure of output per worker in non-agriculture 
relative to agriculture. Figure 5 displays these relative productivity differences plotted 
against real GDP per capita for each of the countries in our sample. A striking pattern 
emerges  – non-agricultural productivity in poor countries is far higher than agricultural 
productivity, often by a factor of 10 or more. By contrast, in the rich countries this ratio is 
typically less than 2.  A regression of relative productivity of non-agriculture to 
agriculture on a constant and log of real GDP per capita yields a coefficient of –1.9 on the 
log of real GDP per capita. 
  It is important to note that these productivity measures are based on domestic relative 
prices. While it is of interest to know to what extent this finding is driven by differences 
in real output per worker across countries versus differences in relative prices across 
countries, systematic data for a large set of countries relevant to this issue does not exist. 
Moreover, the studies that have examined this issue are not particularly conclusive.  For 
example, several studies including Prasada Rao (1993) and H ayami and Ruttan (1985) 
find the differences in relative productivities to be at least as large when PPP 
                                                                                                                                                 
GDP are taken from Penn World Tables, v. 5.6, for the available years of coverage; historical data are taken 
from Maddison 1995, pp. 194-206.   8
comparisons are made.
4   Others including Kuznets (1971), Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 
(1992), Schiff and Valdés (1992), and Bautista and Valdés (1993), argue that agricultural 
products are systematically under priced in poor countries relative to world prices by as 
much 40-50 percent. Whichever view we take of prices, the cross-country productivity 
data point to a striking difference between today’s rich and poor countries.  
  This observation leads us to examine the time series data to see whether such large 
relative productivity differences existed in the rich countries a century or so ago when 
they were as poor as today’s poor countries. Although we do not have time series data for 
currently rich countries that covers the range of GDP per capita in the cross section, the 
available data suggests that relative productivity differences in the time series for 
individual countries are significantly smaller than differences in the 1990 cross section. 
For most currently rich countries this ratio has been nearly constant over time and close 
to two.  
  The one exception to this is the United States, which experienced a fairly large drop 
in this ratio between 1870 and 1900 from 4.3 to 2, but thereafter, maintained a more or 
less constant ratio of 2.  Alston and Hatton (1991) actually construct estimates that show 
that in 1925 there was no difference between agricultural and manufacturing earnings 
within geographical r egions in the United States. Alston and Hatton find that the 
differences disappear once one correctly accounts for non-cash payments to agricultural 
workers. Their estimates suggest that much of the large relative historical productivity 
                                                 
4 The Prasada Rao PPP adjusted data (pp. 135-36, Table 7.3) show that agricultural output per worker in the 
highest-productivity country (New Zealand) is greater than the comparable figure for the lowest-
productivity country (Mozambique) by a factor of 244.  The ratio of average productivity in the five highest 
productivity countries to the average productivity in the five lowest is 139.3! Hayami and Ruttan (1985) 
also find differences in agricultural output per worker based on PPP measurements to be at least as large 
than differences in aggregate output per worker. In the 1960 cross-section they find factor differences in   9
difference in the  United States is an artifact of the north being twice as rich as the south 
and manufacturing being more heavily concentrated in the North. Their estimate suggests 
a relative productivity for the United States in 1925 around one. 
  Figure 6 plots the time series data for the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada, along with the 1990 cross-section data on relative sectoral productivity against 
time.
5 Clearly, a large number of today’s poor countries are far away from the path 
followed in the past by today’s rich countries. A similar finding appears in Kuznets 
(1971). Using cross-section data from the 1950’s and time series data for the period 
1860-1960, he established the same patterns for relative productivities in the cross section 
and time series, though his sample of countries was somewhat smaller than ours. 
  The data analysis leads to several obvious questions. Why are relative productivity 
differences in today’s poor countries so much larger than was the case for today’s rich 
countries a century ago, w hen they had comparable incomes? Why are agricultural 
workers in the poorest countries apparently so unproductive? And why is there not 
greater movement of labor out of agriculture in developing countries?
6  The rest of the 
paper attempts to answer these questions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
agricultural output per worker between the top five and bottom five countries to be about 30, but in the 
1980 cross section the factor difference is close to 50. 
5 Data on agriculture’s shares of employment and output for the United Kingdom and Canada are taken 
from Mitchell (1992 and 1993); those for the United States are taken from the US Commerce Department’s 
Historical Statistics of the United States (1975) and Kurian (1994) for more recent years. Estimates of real 
per capita GDP are taken from Maddison (1995) and PWT 5.6. 
6 From an open economy perspective, there is an additional Ricardian puzzle.  Given the relative 
productivity of agriculture and non-agriculture in rich and poor countries, it would seem that the poor 
countries have a profound comparative advantage in specializing in non-agricultural production.   10
3. Background 
Recent efforts to account for international income differences within the neoclassical 
growth model have examined the consequences of cross-country differences in 
government policies for steady-state income.
7 Two classes of policies have been studied: 
those that serve to raise the cost of investment goods relative to consumption goods and 
those that serve to decrease total factor productivity.
8 A brief overview of these efforts is 
instructive for our analysis.    
The standard one-sector neoclassical growth model assumes a representative 







t C b  
where 0 <b <1 is the discount factor and Ct is consumption in period t. The household is 
endowed with the economy’s initial capital stock, K0, and one unit of time in each period. 
A constant returns to scale technology produces output ( Yt) using capital ( Kt) and labor 
(Nt) according to: 
q q g
- + =
1 ] ) 1 [( t
t
t t N K A Y ,  
where  g is the rate of exogenous technological change and  A is a  TFP parameter  that 
summarizes the effects of government policies on a country’s output per unit of the 
composite input. Feasibility requires that 
t t t Y X C £ + , where Xt is investment in period t. 
Capital evolves according to  ( ) p d / 1 1 t t t X K K + - = + , where  d is the depreciation rate 
                                                 
7 Examples include Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000), Chari et al. (1996), Restuccia and Urrutia (2000), 
Schmitz (1998), and Parente et al. (2000). 
8 Empirical evidence suggests that both of these channels are relevant. Jones (1994) presents evidence that 
the relative price of equipment is negatively correlated with GDP per capita, and  Hall and Jones (1999)   11
and  p  ‡ 1 summarizes the effect of country-specific policies that  increase the cost of 
investment relative to consumption. We refer to p as the barrier to capital accumulation.
9  
   In assessing the consequences of  differences in TFP or barriers to capital 
accumulation for differences in output, values for  A  and  p  can be normalized to one for 
the US economy without loss of generality. If another country has polices that yield TFP 
parameter A and barrier p it is easy  to show that steady state output of the United States 
relative to this country is given by 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 q q q p
- - - A . This theory can generate large 
differences in output per capita given appropriate combinations of values for A, p, and q. 
A number of researchers (see e.g., Prescott 1999, Parente and Prescott 2000) have 
argued that a value of two thirds for the share parameter q is reasonable. This argument is 
based on a broad interpretation of capital that encompasses both tangible and intangible 
varieties.  In what follows we adopt this parameterization and interpretation of capital. 
Although this parameterization is subject to debate, we note, however, that from a purely 
algebraic perspective, given a value for the capital share one can always generate larger 
income differences by simply increasing the size of the distortions.  
   
4. The Neoclassical Growth Model with Agriculture 
 
In this section we extend the standard neoclassical growth model to explicitly incorporate 
an agricultural sector, and ask whether  it can account for the sectoral development facts 
                                                                                                                                                 
present evidence that measured TFP is positively correlated with GDP per capita. See also Restuccia and 
Urrutia (2000) and Collins and Williamson (1999) for evidence on the price of capital. 
9 While it is clearly important to understand how specific policies are mapped into A and p we think this 
reduced form approach serves to better highlight the key elements of our subsequent analysis. As noted 
above, we do not adhere to a literal interpretation of p as a policy distortion; the variable could equally well 
reflect a variety of institutional differences across economies.   12
described previously if policy distortions are present.   The numeraire for this economy is 
the manufactured good. 
4.1 Model Economy 
 
  Instantaneous utility is now defined over two consumption goods. The secular decline 
in agriculture’s share of economic activity restricts the functional form of preferences to 
the Stone-Geary variety.  The discounted stream of utility is thus,  







t a a C f b ,                                   (1) 
 
where  f is a preference parameter,  at  is consumption of the agricultural good, c t is 
consumption of the manufactured good, and a > 0 is the subsistence term.
10  
  The agricultural sector produces output (Yat) using capital (Kat) and labor (Nat) as 
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1 ] ) 1 [( .                                        (3) 
The manufacturing sector produces output ( Ymt) using capital ( Kmt) and labor ( Nmt) as 
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m q q g
- + =
1 ] ) 1 [( .                                      (4) 
As we note later in this section, the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions 
has important substantive consequences for our analysis.
12  We do think, however, that 
this is the natural starting point for an analysis of this sort. Moreover, this assumption is 
                                                 
10 Following a longstanding convention in the literature, we refer to the non-agricultural sector as the 
manufacturing sector, although in our empirical work we will interpret this sector to include manufacturing 
activity as well as other industrial activities and services. 
11 We abstract from land as a fixed factor in agriculture. Adding land to the model does not affect our main 
conclusions. 
12 Note that we assume here that exogenous technological change occurs at the same rate in the two sectors.  
This assumption is motivated by the lack of any discernible trend in the relative price of agriculture to non-
agriculture goods in the United States over the last 100 years.   13
supported by empirical work. (See, for example, the cross-country analysis of Hayami 
and Ruttan 1985). 
  Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption or to augment the 
two capital stocks. The manufacturing resource constraint is thus, Ct + Xmt + Xat £ Ymt. 
Output from the agriculture sector can only be used for consumption so the agriculture 
resource constraint is simply  at £ Yat. Capital is sector specific, so the laws of motion for 
the two stocks of capital in the economy are: 
m t m t m mt X K K p d / ) 1 ( 1 + - = + ,                                                    (5) 
a t a t a t a X K K p d / ) 1 ( 1 + - = + .                                                     (6) 
As can be seen we assume that both capital stocks depreciate at a common rate. This 
restriction is not important to our findings.  We do allow, however, policy to have 
differential effects on the accumulation of each capital stock through sector specific 
barriers  pa  and  pm.  Given the sectoral patterns documented earlier, it seems potentially 
important to allow for policies that may differ across sectors.   Moreover, by allowing for 
these sectoral differences, it is possible to analyze the consequences of the type of 
distortionary policy followed by many poor countries the purpose of which was to 
maintain low agricultural good prices.  This case corresponds to a higher value of the 
policy distortion pa. 
  The household is endowed with one unit of time in each period, which it allocates 
between working in the manufacturing sector and working in the agricultural sector, and 
with the economy’s initial capital stocks, Ka0, and Km0. 
 
4.2 Quantitative Findings   14
It is not necessary to calibrate the model to determine whether this model can account for 
the relative sectoral productivity differences observed across countries.  It cannot. The 
model predicts that agriculture to non-agriculture productivity will be the same across 
countries regardless of policy differences reflected in TFP or barriers to capital 
accumulation. 
13  The reason for this is that the agricultural real wage rate and the non-
agricultural real wage rate must be equal at each date in equilibrium.  This follows from 
the assumption that labor is perfectly mobile between sectors. Profit maximization by 
firms in both sectors implies that  a a a a a Y p N w = q  and  m m m m m Y p N w = q . Since wa = 
wm and production technologies in each sector are the same across countries, it follows 
that relative agricultural productivity in each country 












.                                                      (7) 
Policy distortions, therefore, have no effect on relative productivity. The straightforward 
agricultural extension of the neo-classical growth model cannot account for the sectoral 
relative productivity differences observed across countries.
14 
The failure of the neoclassical growth model extended in a natural way to include 
agriculture suggests a number of possible alternative theories. One such alternative is to 
allow for factors that impede the movement of labor from agriculture into manufacturing. 
Some countries do heavily restrict movement out of rural areas. We do not follow this 
approach. Instead, we consider an extension of the neoclassical growth model that allows 
for home production activities that differ between rural and urban sectors.  
                                                 
13 To examine whether the model can account for the sectoral transformation undergone by the rich 
countries, one would need to calibrate the model.  The failures of this model along these dimensions are 
discussed in the next section.   15
 
 
5. The Model with Agriculture and Home Production 
In this section we propose an extension to the model and examine whether it can account 
for the US secular growth facts and the sectoral development facts. Our extension builds 
on the work of Parente et al. (2000), which adds a home production sector to the standard 
growth model. The key feature of our extension is to allow for spatial heterogeneity and 
have a rural region that is more conducive to home production opportunities than the 
urban region.     
  With no loss in generality, we focus on policy differences that lead to differences in 
the cost of investment goods relative to consumption goods rather than differences in 
TFP.    As shown by Parente and Prescott (2000) there is a one-to-one mapping from this 
type of distortion to TFP.   Additionally, as explained previously, this policy distortion 
can be viewed as offering a way to characterize the urban-biased policies followed by 
many poor countries in the postwar period.  
 
 
5.1 Model Economy 
The critical aspect of our formulation is that we incorporate spatial heterogeneity by 
having an urban region and a rural region. Agriculture takes place exclusively in the rural 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 The model actually predicts that real agricultural output per agricultural worker is higher in poor 
countries compared to rich on account that the relative price of agricultural goods is lower in the distorted 
economy. This is another failure of the model.   16
region, whereas manufacturing is assumed to take place exclusively in the urban region.
15 
Individuals living in both regions are assumed to have access to home production 
technologies, but rural people have a different home  production technology than people 
living in urban areas.  
  To simplify the analysis, we assume that the economy is populated with a continuum 
of identical infinitely lived families, with each family consisting of a continuum of family 
members. Families, rather than individual family members, own the economy’s capital. 
This assumption buys us considerable simplicity since we do not have to keep track of 
the heterogeneity in capital holdings associated with differences in location.  Family 
members live either in the rural area, in which case they divide their time between the 
home sector and the agricultural sector, or in the urban area, in which case they divide 
their time between the home sector and the manufacturing sector. A family head makes 
all the decisions for the family  – how many family members live in each region, how 
they allocate their time between market and home production, how much consumption 
each receives and how much capital to accumulate. In keeping with the analysis of the 
previous section, we continue to assume perfect mobility of individuals across 
locations.
16 
  For reasons of space, we describe only those aspects of the model economy that are 
associated with the introduction of home production and spatial heterogeneity. 
Preferences are the same as before and given by equation (1). However, non-agriculture 
                                                 
15 Of course this is a stylization. In reality, a considerable amount of non-agricultural market production 
takes place in rural areas. Moreover, urban agriculture (e.g., poultry and swine) may be important in some 
locations. Nonetheless, the stylization is convenient here. 
16 This differs, for example, from the approach taken by Caselli and Coleman 1998.   17
consumption,  Ct, is now a CES aggregator of the manufacturing good cmt, and the home 
good, cht,   
r r r m m
/ 1 ] ) 1 ( [ ht mt t c c C - + =                                              (8) 
In (8), the parameter  m reflects the relative importance of the home and market non-
agriculture goods and the parameter  r determines the elasticity of substitution between 
home-produced and market-produced goods.  
  Individuals must allocate their time between market and home production in each 
period. For workers located in the rural region this constraint is written  1 = + t R t a n n , 
while for workers located in the urban region it is written  1 = + t U t m n n . With the 
introduction of home production, the capital endowment includes rural home capital and 
urban home capital denoted by  KR0,  KU0.   Individual family members are still endowed 
with one unit of time each. 
  The technologies for the manufacturing and agricultural sectors are as before. With 





1 ] ) 1 [( jt
t
jt j jt N K A Y ,                                     (9) 
where Kjt is capital, and Njt is hours in home production in region j = U, R.  An important 
feature of our specification is that we assume that home production opportunities are 
“better” in the rural sector than in the urban sector. There are various ways this could be 
modeled; we choose to incorporate this feature by assuming that the two home   18
production technologies are identical except for a difference in TFP. Specifically, we 
assume that AR > AU. 
17 
  Investment in home capital, like investment in market capital, requires forgoing 
consumption of the manufactured good. The laws of motion for the home capital  stocks 
are: 
t R t R Rt X K K + - = + ) 1 ( 1 d  ,                                         (10) 
   t U t U Ut X K K + - = + ) 1 ( 1 d .                                         (11) 
As is apparent, home capital is assumed to depreciate at the same rate as market capital, 
but the policy distortions do not affect home capital. Relaxing these assumptions does not 
have a large impact on our findings, but in any case we view this as a reasonable 
benchmark. 
  The family head’s objective is to maximize the discounted value of average utility 
across family members. Let  lt denote the fraction of the representative family living in 
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17 Alternatives include assuming that the rural home production function is less capital intensive than the 
urban home production function, or that there are complementarities in time inputs between agricultural 
activities and home production. For example, child care may be more easily supplied while working in 
rural areas than in urban areas.   19
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given initial capital stocks.
18  Equation (13) is the family’s intertemporal budget 
constraint, where Pt is the Arrow-Debreu date 0 price of the manufacturing good at date t. 
Equations (14) and (15) are the time use constraints of individual family members living 
in the rural and urban regions. Equation (16) states that home production allocated to 
rural family members is less than or equal to the total home production produced in that 
region. Equation (17) is the analogous constraint for the urban population.  
  In our abstraction there are two features that distinguish home production from 
manufacturing sector output.  First, capital can only be produced in the manufacturing 
sector. One possible variation is to assume that home capital can be produced in the home 
sector, though we have not explored it. Second, home produced output cannot be traded. 
In some instances we think of this as a defining characteristic of home production  – e.g., 
                                                 
18 The fact that the family chooses the division of individuals between the urban and rural areas means that 
this problem is not concave.  However, it can still be shown that the solution to this problem is 
characterized by the usual first order conditions. See Rogerson (1984) for a proof in a similar context.   20
child-care is home produced only if the family provides it for itself. In other cases, this 
assumption is probably not appropriate—for example, clothing made  at home by family 
members in the rural area may be sent to family members in the city. While our 
assumption is extreme, what is important for our results is that a significant component of 
home production cannot easily be transferred across regions. 
 
5.2 Quantitative Findings 
In this section we examine the quantitative properties of the model in order to determine 
whether it can account for the sectoral differences observed across countries and across 
time within a given country.   We proceed by first restricting the model’s parameters so 
that its equilibrium path over a 120-year period roughly matches the U.S. economy’s path 
over the 1870-1990 period.  For this parameterized economy, we then examine how 
policy distortions affect the model’s predictions for  cross country income differences and 
sectoral differences.   
 
Calibration 
There are three aspects of the model that make the calibration procedure non-standard.  
The first is that capital is interpreted broadly to include intangible capital. This 
interpretation causes a discrepancy between output in the model and output in the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The reason for this discrepancy is that 
investments in intangible capital are not measured in the national accounts according to 
current a ccounting practices. This necessitates that we adjust output in the model by the   21
amount of this unmeasured investment in order to make comparisons with the NIPA data.  
(See Parente and Prescott 2000 for an extended discussion.) 
  The second aspect of the model that makes the calibration non-standard is the 
subsistence term in the utility function. This term implies that we can no longer view the 
US economy as if it were on a constant growth path, as is the case in the one sector 
version of the model described in Section 3. In this version, the economy will only 
approach a constant growth path equilibrium as the effect of the subsistence term 
becomes infinitesimally small, or equivalently, as agriculture’s share of GDP approaches 
a constant. In reality, this s hare has declined rather substantially over the postwar period, 
suggesting that the postwar period should not be viewed as a constant growth path.   In 
terms of the calibration, this means that the parametric values must be restricted to match 
this decline. It also means that we cannot assign the technology growth rate parameter g 
to the average growth rate of U.S. GDP per capita over the postwar period. However, we 
can still require that the model match the growth rate of US GDP per capita over some 
interval. While this match is not solely determined by the value of  g, it will be heavily 
influenced by it. 
  The third aspect that makes the calibration non-standard is home production.   Home 
production is unmeasured in the NIPA.   The stock of household durables can be used as 
a rough estimate for the total stock of home capital. However, there is no way to 
determine how much of this is allocated between rural households and urban households.   
This lack of measurement implies that it will not be possible to restrict all the values of 
the home production preference and technology parameters with the use of data.  Some   22
assumptions will have to be made to restrict a number of these parametric values. In this 
sense the calibration should be seen as something exploratory rather than as definitive.  
  The empirical counterparts of the model are as follows. Total (measured) investment 
in market capital is the sum of residential and non-residential investment expenditures 
plus 25 percent of government expenditures. The r emaining part of government 
expenditures is considered to be consumption. With these adjustments, the ratio of total 
(measured) investment to (NIPA) GDP in 1990 is 20 percent.  The value of agricultural 
output is the value of output of the farm sector, and the value of (measured) 
nonagricultural output is GDP less the value of farm output. The source of these statistics 
is the  1991 Economic Report of the President, Tables B1, B8, and B32. In 1990 
agriculture’s share of GDP is equal to 0.023. For 1870 the corresponding value is 0.22, 
taken from the US Commerce Department’s  Historical Statistics of the United States 
(1975), Series F 251. Agricultural capital is simply non-residential farm capital. 
Measured non-agricultural physical capital is simply total capital minus agricultural 
capital. The source of the capital stock data is Musgrave (1993), Tables 2 and 4. The 
resulting physical capital- measured output ratios for agriculture and non-agriculture are 
1.8 and 2.4 respectively, using output measured at annual frequency.  The empirical 
counterparts relevant for home production are the 1990 stock of household durables, 
which we take as a measure of the stock of household capital, and the fraction of 
discretionary time spent in market work for individuals outside the agricultural sector. 
We note that the empirical counterparts of the residences of both farmers and non-
farmers are included as part of the manufactured capital stock, rather than as part of 
household capital.    23
  Non-home production parameter values are restricted as follows. TFP parameters, Am 
and  Aa, and barrier parameters,  pm  and  pa, are normalized to 1.0 for the United States 
economy. This can be done without loss of generality as the values of these parameters 
only affect the units in which both outputs are measured and the relative price level of the 
agricultural to non-agricultural good. Following Parente and Prescott (2000) we assume 
that the total capital share,  qm, for the manufacturing sector is two-thirds. This two-thirds 
share is then allocated between physical and intangible capital by requiring that the ratio 
of physical capital to measured output in the non-agricultural sector matches its value in 
the data for 1990.   The depreciation rate is obtained by using the capital stock laws of 
motions given by equations (5) and (6), 1990 observations for total physical investment, 
the physical capital stock, and the average annual growth rate of the U.S. economy over 
the 1960-90 period.  The agriculture technology parameter is then obtained from the 
equilibrium conditions,  a a a a a Y p K r = q , and ra = I + d, and observations for the average 
annual real interest rate over the postwar period and the 1990  Ka/paYa  ratio.  The 
exogenous rate of technological change,  g, and the subjective time discount factor, b, are 
chosen so that the average annual growth rate of the GDP per capita and the average 
annual real interest rate for the model economy along its equilibrium path corresponding 
to the 1960-90 period match their counterparts in the data.  
  None of the observations matched thus far is particularly related to the process of 
structural transformation. We make use of the data on the structural transformation in the 
United States by requiring that the model match agriculture’s share of GDP in both 1870 
and 1990. Heuristically, to the extent that in 1990 the United States is nearing a constant   24
growth path, the 1990 observation will be close to the value of f, and the initial value will 
provide information on the subsistence parameter. 
  The introduction of home production adds five parameters to the model:  m, r, a, AR, 
and  AU. As is evident by the fact that we have two observations related to home 
production, we must rely on some additional information to tie down values of the home 
production parameters.  It is not possible to identify the elasticity of substitution between 
market and non-market consumption from first moments. Consequently, we rely on the 
estimates of this parameter in the literature. Rupert  et al.  (1995) and McGrattan  et al. 
(1997) obtain estimates from micro data and macro data respectively in the range .40-.45. 
Though we think that the relevant elasticity may be even slightly higher at low levels of 
development we set r = .40 in our benchmark model.
19 The values of the TFP parameters 
affect the units in which output is measured. We are thus free to normalize one of these 
two parameters to 1. We choose to assign AR = 1.0.  As our premise is that TFP in home 
production in the rural region is greater than its counterpart in the urban region, we set AU 
= .90 in our benchmark specification. We will examine the sensitivity of our findings to 
changes in  AU. Having made these assignments, the two observations that we added can 
be used to determine values for a and m.   
  A final issue in the calibration is the choice of values for initial capital stocks. Rather 
than attempt to obtain estimates of capital stocks for 1870, we choose these values so the 
implied series for investment and sectoral labor shares do not display any abrupt changes 
in the p eriods following 1870. Loosely speaking, the idea is to choose capital stocks for 
                                                 
19 The higher value for r corresponds to an assumption that home produced goods are more substitutable 
for market-produced non-agricultural goods in poor countries than in rich countries. In other words, home-
produced goods are more similar to market-produced goods in poor countries than in rich countries. This 
seems entirely reasonable.   25
1870 that would be consistent with the economy being on a transition path that began 
some years earlier.
20  
  The calibrated parameter values are reported in Table 1. Note that g = .019, which is 
slightly lower than the 2 percent average growth rate over 1960-1990 that we targeted in 
our calibration.  This is because the growth rate during this period is still slightly higher 
than its value on the constant growth path. Nonetheless, the behavior of the calibrated 
model in the post World War II period is very similar to a constant growth equilibrium. 
For example, the capital to output ratios, the investment to output ratio, and the growth 
rate of real GDP are all nearly constant.  Our procedure for allocating the two-thirds share 
for total capital in the nonagricultural sector yields a split of .19 for tangible capital and 
.48 for intangible capital.
21 This implies that in 1990, investment in intangible capital is 
around one-half of  measured GDP, which is in line with the estimates suggested by 
Parente and Prescott (2000). 
 
Properties of the Calibrated Model 
The United States, 1870-1990 
    At this stage, it is informative to examine some of the long run properties of the 
calibrated model and compare them with their counterparts in the data. As we calibrate 
the model to reproduce the beginning and ending values for agriculture’s share of GDP in 
the United States, we trivially match these observations. However, with respect to the rate 
of decline in agriculture’s share of GDP, the model matches the US experience 
                                                 
20 Given that our model is in discrete time, this procedure really only restricts initial capital stocks to lie in 
some interval. However, since the different values in this interval do not have any effect on the equilibrium 
beyond a few periods this does not appear to be a serious issue. 
21 This split is relevant because of the need to do the GNP accounts excluding intangible investments.   26
reasonably well with the exception of some large swings about trend in the 1890-1930 
period.  We did not explicitly calibrate to match agriculture’s share of employment, in 
either  1870 or 1990. In the United States in 1870, agriculture’s share of employment is 
much larger than its share of output. The calibrated model also displays this property, 
though the difference is not as large as in the data. Specifically, the model predicts  an 
employment share of 36 percent in 1870 versus the value of 48 percent found in the data 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1975).   
    There is good reason to believe that the 48 percent found in the data overestimates 
agriculture’s share of employment in 1870.  More specifically, in any year there are a 
large number of part time workers in US agriculture.   Part time workers are not 
distinguished from full time workers in constructing the employment share data for 
agriculture.  If they were, agriculture’s share of employment in the data would be lower.  
The discrepancy between the model and the data along this dimension is not very large. 
    Next we turn to the model’s predictions for the behavior of relative sectoral 
productivities and prices over time. The model predicts that the ratio of average labor 
productivity in the two sectors is very nearly constant and equal to one.
22 This is 
consistent with the estimates from Alston and Hatton (1991) for the early part of the 
period.
23   For relative prices, the changes over the 120-year period are quite small. In 
particular, the relative price of agriculture in the model is effectively constant, changing 
by roughly 1 percent over the 120-year period. This accords well with the data (see, e.g., 
                                                 
22 If there were no unmeasured output then one can show analytically that this ratio is constant. 
23 This ratio did, however, decrease significantly in the period from 1870-1900. But, as noted by Kuznets 
(1971), the US is the only industrialized country to experience such a decline and it can be attributed to the 
fact that innovations in transportation had a large impact on where farming could take place. For this 
reason, the failure of the model to predict a decline in relative average productivity in the late 1800’s is not 
so disconcerting.   27
Kongsamut  et al. (1997)). Additionally, the real rate of return for the calibrated economy 
shows this same small decline, decreasing from 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent over the 120-
year period.  
  The model has rich predictions for time allocations.  Not surprisingly, given our 
assumptions about home production possibilities, we find that individuals in the rural 
region devote more of their time to home production than do workers in the urban region. 
More interesting, our model predicts a decline in the fraction of time that an individual 
spends in market work over the 120-year period. The decline in the workweek in 
manufacturing is more than 10 percent, and virtually all of it takes place between 1870 
and 1960. Hence, this model can account for a large part of the secular decline in the 
workweek in manufacturing. In the agricultural sector the decline is even larger: the 
workweek falls by almost 25 percent. Coincident with this secular decrease in time 
devoted to market work, there is a large movement of workers from the rural to the urban 
region.  
 
Cross Country Comparisons 
How does the introduction of home production possibilities affect the model’s predictions 
for sectoral differences across rich and poor countries? We now use this model to 
examine the implications of distortionary policies on the development process. To do this 
we contrast the behavior of our calibrated economy with no distortions to another 
economy with barriers,  pa  and  pm, that increase the resource cost of capital in the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. As above, we assume that initial capital stocks in   28
the distorted economy are such that the equilibrium paths for other variables display no 
abrupt changes over the 120-year period. 
  We study three cases. The first assumes that the distortions apply equally to b oth 
capital stocks and result in a fourfold increase in the cost of both types of capital relative 
to the undistorted economy (i.e., pm = pa = 4). The second assumes that distortions only 
apply to the manufacturing capital stock (i.e., pm = 4, pa = 1). The third case assumes that 
distortions only apply to the agriculture capital stock (i.e., pm =1, pa = 4). 
  Table 2 reports our results.  For exposition purposes, we report only the results from 
the benchmark economy, (i.e., pm = pa = a), and the case where pm = pa = 4.  We do not 
report the results for the pm = 1 and pa = 4 case because it is practically identical to the 
benchmark economy. We do not report the results for the pm = 4 and pa = 1 case because 
it is practically identical to the i.e., pm = pa = 4 case.   
  The table reports NIPA GDP per capita ( Y), agriculture’s share of GDP ( paYa/Y), 
agriculture’s share of employment (1-l), relative productivity 
))] 1 /( /( ) / [( l l - ” a a M a m Y p Y y y , time allocated to agriculture work in the rural sector 
(na), and time allocated to market work in the manufacturing sector (nm) at various dates 
across the undistorted and distorted economies. Note that our measure of relative 
productivity is chosen to correspond to the concept used in the data. Specifically, it looks 
at output per worker and not output per unit of labor input. 
  The model with home production generates differences in GDP per capita observed in 
the data. The difference in GDP per capita associated with a barrier of 4 is approximately 
the factor 30 observed across countries. The model also predicts sizable differences in the 
share of employment accounted for by agriculture across rich and poor countries in 1990.   29
In the undistorted economy, agriculture’s share of employment is 5 percent in 1990, 
while in the distorted economy its share is 63 percent.  Third, the model generates large 
cross-country differences in sectoral relative productivity. Relative productivity of the 
agricultural sector in the model is almost six times larger in the undistorted economy than 
it is in t he distorted economy in 1990.  This is actually very close to the difference 
between the richest and poorest countries in the 1990 cross-section.  
  The reason the model generates these large differences in relative productivity is that 
there are large differences in time allocations of rural workers in 1990 across the rich 
(undistorted) and poor (distorted) economies. Rural workers in the poor economy are 
working only about 20% as much in market activity as their counterparts in a rich 
economy. Differences  in time allocations in the urban region are much less pronounced. 
This asymmetry between the distortions on rural and urban time allocations is due to the 
asymmetry of home production opportunities across rural and urban regions. 
  Recall that in the data i t is unclear to what extent differences in relative sectoral 
productivity reflect differences in real outputs or differences in prices. In our model we 
can easily assess the role of these two factors.  In the 1990 cross section consisting of the 
distorted  and undistorted economy, we find that the difference is accounted for almost 
entirely by the difference in relative prices. That is, differences in real output per worker 
in agriculture are roughly the same as differences in GDP per worker.  
  As can be seen in the table, relative productivity differentials across distorted and 
undistorted countries increase over time. This phenomenon is driven by the secular 
change in time allocations of workers in the two regions. In the distorted economy the 
secular decline in the (market) workweek in the rural region is much larger than in the   30
undistorted economy. Initially, although the distorted economy has more workers in the 
rural region, workers in the distorted economy have roughly the same time allocations as 
workers in the undistorted economy. This is because the subsistence constraint is 
relatively binding. Over time, this constraint eases and the time allocation in the rural 
area becomes increasingly distorted toward home production. Although the table stops in 
1990 it is worth noting that the time allocation of rural workers to market production in 
subsequent years in the distorted economy continues to show a decline, although at a 
slower rate than over the 1870-1990 period. In the undistorted economy, in contrast, there 
is no subsequent decline. As a result, the relative productivity differentials continue to 
widen. Moreover, these differentials begin to reflect real output differences in agriculture.  
  The one dimension of the data on which the performance of the model is not 
particularly strong is agriculture’s share of output across rich and poor countries. The 
differences predicted by the model are still small relative to what is found in the data. 
One reason why the differences in agriculture’s share of output implied by the model are 
so small is that individuals living in the rural region in the distorted economy allocate a 
small fraction of their time to market activities. A second reason is that the relative price 
of agriculture is lower in the poorer country, by roughly 80 percent. Alternative 
specifications for preferences may give rise to smaller effects on relative prices and help 
the model on this dimension.  Accounting for the large difference in agriculture’s share of 
GDP across rich and poor countries is a matter for future work. 
  A rather surprising result is that measured output in the distorted economy grows at a 
much slower rate than in the undistorted economy over the 120-year period, implying that 
relative GDPs diverge for a long time. In fact,  as Table 4 documents, it is not until   31
roughly the end of the sample period that the distorted economy displays a growth rate of 
real GDP that is roughly equal to the exogenous growth rate of technology. This pattern 
is not generated in the other models studied in this paper. It is, however, the pattern 
observed in the data. With the start of the Industrial Revolution in England, disparities in 
living standards between the world’s rich and poor countries began to increase. These 
disparities continued to increase until 1950. Our research shows that one does not need to 
assume differential rates of exogenous technological change or poverty traps to account 
for this pattern. Instead, a two-sector version of the neoclassical growth model with home 
production, a b road concept of capital, and a subsistence term can qualitatively generate 
this pattern.  We conclude that this model may be very useful in accounting for the 
divergence in international incomes from the Industrial Revolution to the latter half of the 
twentieth century. 
 
Sensitivity to Alternative Values of AU 
A key feature of our abstraction is that TFP is lower in urban home production than in 
rural home production. In the numerical experiments, this was represented by a 10 
percent productivity gap between rural and urban areas in home production. Given the 
arbitrary nature of this parameterization, it is worthwhile to examine the sensitivity of the 
model’s results to changes in this parameter value. We, therefore, consider alternative 
values of .85, .95 and 1.00 for AU.  In each case we recalibrate the model as discussed 
previously and compute the equilibrium path for 120 years. In the interest of space we 
only report statistics for 1990 rather than the entire time series.     32
  Table 3 presents the results. Several features are worth noting.  Starting with the case 
with no relative productivity differences, we observe that the model still predicts large 
differences in income across the two economies. However, it no longer predicts large 
differences in relative sectoral productivities between rich and poor countries. As  AU is 
decreased several patterns emerge. First, the difference in income per capita increases. 
Second, the difference in the share of the population living in the rural area increases. 
And third, the difference in relative sectoral productivities also increases. The table also 
indicates that the difference in agriculture’s share of GDP also increases, but this effect is 
fairly modest. The qualitative patterns in this table are intuitive given the mechanics of 
the model discussed earlier. We conclude from this that the model predictions that we are 
emphasizing require relatively small productivity differences. Even with a differential of 
.05 the model generates results that are quite different from the two-sector model without 
home production. 
Welfare Comparison 
Lastly, we think it is instructive to examine some of the welfare implications of our 
model. As discussed and analyzed in Parente  et al.  (2000), home production models 
imply that differences in measured income across countries overstate the true differences 
in well-being across countries.
24 To give a sense of the overstatement, we note that in our 
benchmark specification, in 1990, the undistorted economy consumes roughly 33 times 
more of the m anufactured consumption good than does the distorted economy, 1.1 times 
more of the agricultural good, but only about two-thirds as much home produced output. 
                                                 
24 Note that we have also assumed that there is unmeasured investment in the economy. This will not matter 
for our welfare calculations since they are based on consumption flows.   33
In what follows we use our model to give a more precise measure of actual welfare 
differences and contrast them to those obtained in models without home production.  
  We begin with the standard one-sector growth model described in Section 3 of this 
paper. We shall assume a parameterization that roughly accords with the values used in 
Section 5 and for parameters q, d , and b, and a barrier p such that the factor difference in 
relative steady state incomes in this model  equals the factor difference of 33 we obtained 
in our benchmark specification for 1990. Given  q = 2/3, the corresponding value of  p is 
5.75.  
  We now describe our procedure to compute the welfare gain associated with 
removing the barrier. We note that our measure is not affected by monotone 
transformations of the utility function. We begin by first computing the equilibrium path 
that would result if an economy beginning in the steady state corresponding to p = 5.75 
eliminates this barrier.  We next compute the utility of the representative agent associated 
with this equilibrium path. We also compute the utility of the representative agent if the 
economy does not eliminate this barrier and it remains in the steady state corresponding 
to p = 5.75.  We then ask by what factor would we have to increase consumption in each 
period under this second scenario in order that the resulting lifetime u tility equal that 
achieved when the barrier were removed.  
  The number we obtain in this procedure is 2.8;  i.e., if consumption were to be 
increased by a factor of 2.8 the individual would be indifferent about removing the 
barrier.  Note that this number i s small in comparison to the differences in steady state 
consumptions. The ratio of the two consumptions across the two steady states is 33 – the 
same as the ratio of the two outputs. The fact that our compensating differential is so   34
much smaller than this factor indicates the importance of allowing for the accumulation 
of capital needed to reach the new steady state. 
  We now repeat this calculation in the context of our two-sector growth model with 
home production. That is, we assess the gain in utility that the individuals in the poor 
economy would experience if the distortion were removed, taking the starting point as the 
1990 allocations in the distorted economy.  After computing the resulting equilibrium and 
the lifetime utility of the representative family, we then ask by what factor would we 
have to increase consumption in each period in the economy that does not remover the 
barriers in order to make the lifetime family utilities the same between economies. In 
calculating this factor increase, we assume the consumption of all family members is 
increased proportionately. The number we obtain is 1.9, which is about two-thirds of the 
number we obtained in the welfare calculation for the one-sector growth model with no 
home production. We conclude from this that while home production does diminish the 
welfare differences between rich and poor countries for a given difference in measured 
output, the reduction is not particularly large.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Development economists have long noted the importance of  agriculture in the share of 
economic activity in poor countries. Contemporary researchers working with applied 
general equilibrium models almost always abstract from sectoral issues. In this paper, we 
introduced agriculture into the neoclassical growth model and examined the implications 
for international incomes and sectoral patterns. We found that a straightforward extension 
of the model fails to account for key sectoral differences observed across rich and poor 
countries. This failure led us to consider  an extension of the model that incorporates   35
home production.  The key implication of this model is that distortions to capital 
accumulation lead to a relative increase in the amount of unmeasured activity taking 
place in rural areas.  A reduction of the distortions leads to an efficiency-enhancing 
reallocation of inputs plus an increase in measured economic activity. We found the 
model accounts for a number of features of the sectoral transformation observed in 
economic data, both in the cross section and the time series.  
   36
References 
Alston, Lee and Timothy Hatton. 1991. “The Earnings Gap Between Agricultural and 
Manufacturing Laborers, 1925-41.” Journal of Economic History 51 (March): 83-99. 
 
Bautista, Romeo and Alberto Valdés.  1993.  The Bias Against Agriculture: Trade and 
Macroeconomic Policies in Developing Countries.  San Francisco: A Copublication of 
the International Center for Economic Growth and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute, with ICS Press. 
 
Caselli, Francesco and Wilbur John Coleman II.  1998.  How regions converge.  Manuscript: 
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. 
 
Chari, V.V., Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan.  1996.  The poverty of nations: A 
quantitative exploration.” NBER Working Paper 5414. 
 
Chenery, H.B. and M. Syrquin. 1975. Patterns of Development, 1950-1970. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Collins, W. and J. Williamson.  1999 . “Capital goods prices, global capital markets and 
accumulation: 1870-1950.” NBER Working Paper No. 7145. 
 
Cooley, Thomas F. and Edward C. Prescott. Economic growth and business cycles. Chapter 1 
in Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, ed. Thomas F. Cooley. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Echevvaria, Cristina. 1995. Agricultural development vs. industrialization: Effects of trade. 
Canadian Journal of Economics 28 (3): 631-47. 
 
Echevarria, Cristina. 1997. Changes in sectoral composition associated with economic growth. 
International Economic Review 38 (2): 431-52. 
 
Fei, John C. H. and Gustav Ranis. 1964. Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory 
and Policy. A Publication of the Economic Growth Center, Yale University. Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
 
Glomm, Gerhard. 1992. “A Model of Growth and Migration.” Canadian Journal of Economics. 
42 (4): 901-22. 
 
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones.  1999.  Why do some countries produce so much more 
output per worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1): 83-116. 
 
Hayami, Yujiro and Vernon W. Ruttan. 1985. Agricultural Development: An International 
Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Inada, K. 1963. On a two-sector model of economic growth: Comments and a generalization. 
Review of Economic Studies 30 (June): 95-104 
 
Johnston, Bruce F. and John W. Mellor. 1961. The role of agriculture in economic 
development. American Economic Review 51(4): 566-93.   37
 
Johnston, Bruce F. and Peter Kilby. 1975. Agriculture and Structural Transformation: 
Economic Strategies in Late-Developing Countries. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jones, Charles I. 1994. “Economic growth and the relative price of capital.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 34:359-382. 
 
Klenow, Peter and Andres Rodriguez-Clare.  1997.  The neoclassical revival in growth 
economics: Has it gone too far? In Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J. Rotemberg, eds., NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 1997. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Kurian, George Thomas. 1994. Datapedia of the United States 1790-2000: America Year by 
Year. Lanham, MD: Bernan Press. 
 
Kuznets, Simon.  1946.  National Income: A Summary of Findings.  New York: NBER. 
 
__________ 1966. Modern Economic Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
__________ 1971. Economic Growth of Nations. Harvard University Press, Cambridge USA. 
 
Kongsamut, Piyabha, Sergio Rebelo, and Danyang Xie.  1997.  Beyond balanced growth. 
NBER Working Paper 6159. 
 
Krueger, Anne O., Schiff, Maurice and Alberto Valdes.  1992. The Political Economy of 
Agricultural Pricing Policy (Volumes I-III).  A World Bank Comparative Study.  
Baltimore: Published for the World Bank by Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Laitner, John. 1998.  Structural change and economic growth. Manuscript: Department of 
Economics, University of Michigan. 
 
Maddison, Angus.  1995.  Monitoring the World Economy: 1820-1992.  Paris: Development 
Centre of the OECD. 
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil.  1992.  A contribution to the empirics 
of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2):  407-37. 
 
Matsuyama, Kiminori. 1992 Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic 
growth. Journal of Economic Theory 58 (2): 317-34. 
 
Mellor, John W. 1986. Agriculture on the road to industrialization. In Development 
Studies Reconsidered, ed. John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab. Washington DC: 
Overseas Development Council. 
 
Mitchell, B.R.  1992.  International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988.  New York: 
Stockton Press. 
 
Mitchell, B.R.  1993.  International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1988.  New York: 
Stockton Press. 
   38
Mitchell, B.R.  1995.  International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750-1988.  
New York: Stockton Press. 
 
Musgrave, John. Fixed reproducible tangible wealth in the United States: Revised 
estimates for 1990-92 and summary estimates for 1925-92. Survey of Current 
Business (September 1993), 61-69. 
 
Parente, Stephen and Edward C. Prescott. 1994.  Barriers to technology adoption and 
development. Journal of Political Economy 102 (2): 298-321. 
 
Parente, Stephen and Edward C. Prescott. 2000.  The Barrier to Riches. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
 
Parente, Stephen L., Richard Rogerson, and Randall Wright. 2000. Home work in 
development economics: home production and the wealth of nations, forthcoming in 
Journal of Political Economy. 
 
Prescott, Edward C. 1998. Needed: a theory of total factor productivity. International Economic 
Review 39 (3) 525-51.  
 
Prasada Rao, D.S.  1993. Intercountry comparisons of agricultural output and productivity. FAO 
Economic and Social Development Paper 112.  Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
 
Restuccia, Diego and Carlos Urrutia. 2000. Relative prices and investment rates, forthcoming 
in Journal of Monetary Economics 
 
Rogerson, Richard. 1984. “Topics in the Theory of Labor Markets.” Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Minnesota. 
 
Rupert, Peter, Richard Rogerson, and Randall Wright. 1995. Estimating substitution 
elasticities in household production models. Economic Theory 6 (1) 179-193. 
 
Schiff, Maurice and Alberto Valdes.  1992. The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing 
Policy (Volume 4: A Synthesis of the Economics in Developing Countries).  A World 
Bank Comparative Study.  Baltimore: Published for the World Bank by Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Schultz, T. W. 1964. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Syrquin, Moshe. 1988. Patterns of structural change. Chapter 7 in Handbook of Development 
Economics, Vol. I, ed. H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Publishers. 
 
Takayama, A. 1963. On a two-sector model of economic growth: A comparative static analysis. 
Review of Economic Studies 30 (June): 95-104.   39
 
Timmer, C. Peter. 1988. The agricultural transformation. Chapter 8 in Handbook of 
Development Economics, Vol. I, ed. H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science Publishers. 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1975. Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Colonial Times to 1970. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
 
Uzawa, H. 1961. On a two-sector model of economic growth: I. Review of Economic Studies 29 
(October): 40-47. 
 
Uzawa, H. 1963. On a two-sector model of economic growth: II. Review of Economic Studies 30 
(June): 105-118. 




Table 1: Parameter Values for Two Sector Model 
                b   =  0.96      r  = 0.40       m  = 0.36      f  = 0.003    a =  0.39 
                    qm =  0.67      qa = 0.24       a  = 0.11      d =  0.063    g  = .0198 




                     
Table 2. International Comparisons Home Production 
 
                GDP          paYa/GDP        1-l                ym /ya            na            nm 
              p=1   p=4       p=1   p=4      p=1   p=4      p=1    p=4    p=1   p=4    p=1   p=4    
1870      1.00   0.12      .22    .68       .36     .83       1.90   2.32      .58   .68  .64  .70 
1900      1.92   0.14      .13    .49       .22     .74       2.03   2.97      .52   .42   .60  .51 
1930      3.91   0.18      .07    .32       .14     .67       2.13   4.36      .48   .26  .57  .43 
1960      7.31   0.27      .04    .19       .08     .63       2.20   7.36      .46   .16  .55   .40 
1990      13.4   0.41   .02    .12       .05     .63       2.26   12.9      .44   .09   .55   .39 
 
Note: GDP is calculated by using a geometric average of the 1990 price of the agriculture 




Table 3: Sensitivity of Results to Value of TFP in Urban Home 
Production  (1990 Comparisons) 
 
                GDP        paYa/GDP       1-l        ym /ya             na          nm 
 Au      p=1  p =4     p=1  p=4      p=1  p=4    p=1  p =4     p=1 p =4    p=1 p=4  
.85       13.3   .36       .02   .13        .06   .72      2.9   17.5       .37  .08      .55  .44. 
.90       13.4   .41       .02   .12        .05   .63      2.3   12.9       .44  .09      .55  .39  
.95       13.2   .46       .02   .11        .04   .43      1.9     6.5       .50  .13      .55  .31  
1.00     13.2   .53       .02   .11        .04   .19      1.6     1.9       .55  .27      .55  .25  
 
 